Whether consent Can be withdrawn in Mutual Consent Divorce under Sec.13-B of HMA ?

In the opinion of the single judge of Delhi High Court, the following questions of law arise for consideration by a division bench of this Court :-

A) Whether a party, which has under a settlement agreement decreed by

a Court undertaken to file a petition under Section 13B(1) or a motion

under Section 13B(2) of the Act, 1955 or both and has also undertaken to

appear before the said Court for obtaining divorce can be held liable for

contempt, if the said party fails to file or appear in the petition or motion or

both to obtain divorce in view of the option to reconsider/renege the

decision of taking divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B(2) of the

Act?

B) Whether by undertaking before a Court to file a second motion under

Section 13B(2) of the Act, 1955 at Section 13B(1) stage or by giving an

undertaking to a Court to that effect in a separate court proceeding, a party

waives its right to rethink/renege under 13B(2) of the Act, 1955? If yes,

whether such right can be waived by a party under Section 13B(2) of the

Act, 1955?

C) Whether any guidelines are required to be followed by the Court

while recording the undertaking/agreement of the parties with respect to a

petition under Section 13B(1) or a motion under Section 13B(2) of the Act,

1955 or both for obtaining divorce?

D) Whether the judgment in Avneesh Sood (supra) and Shikha Bhatia

(supra) are good law in view of the doubts expressed by this Court in paras

19 to 28 and in view of the Division Bench judgment in Dinesh Gulati

CITATION

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ C.M. APPL. 8610/2015 in CONT.CAS(C) 772/2013

RAJAT GUPTA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr. Prashant Mendiratta with

Ms. Poonam Mehndiratta and

Mr. Harshwardhan Pandey,

Advocates

versus

RUPALI GUPTA ….. Respondent

Through Mr. Ankur Mahindro with

Mr. Shresth Choudhary,

Ms. Megha Agarwal, Ms. Devna,

Mr. Adhirath and Mr. Aarzoo Aneja,

Advocates

WITH

+ CONT.CAS(C) 584/2014

KAMAL GODWANI ….. Petitioner

Through Mr. F.K. Jha with Mr. Sarvesh,

Advocates

versus

ANNU BHARTI ….. Respondent

Through Mr. B.K. Srivastava and Mr.Rajeev

Katyain, Advocates.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 483/2016 & C.M. APPLS. 15724/2016, 28622/2016,

42418/2016

W CDR SITANSHU SINHA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Ashish Virmani with Ms.Paridhi

Dixit, Advocates.

versus

Cont. Cas.(C) 772/2013 & Ors. Page 2 of 29

PRACHI SINGH @ PRACHI SINHA ….. Respondent

Through Mr.Ajit Kumar with Ms.Nutan

Kumari, Advocates.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 484/2016 & C.M. APPLS. 15728/2016, 42419/2016

WG CDR SITANSHU SINHA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Ashish Virmani with Ms.Paridhi

Dixit, Advocates.

versus

PRACHI SINGH @ PRACHI SINHA ….. Respondent

Through Mr.Ajit Kumar with Ms.Nutan

Kumari, Advocates.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 648/2014

  1. ARUN SHARMA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Sunil Mittal, Sr.Advocate with

Ms.Seema Seth and Mr.Dhruv

Grover, Advocates.

versus

POOJA SHARMA ….. Respondent

Through Mr. Prashant Mendiratta with

Ms. Poonam Mehndiratta and

Mr. Harshwardhan Pandey,

Advocates

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 1116/2016

AMRITA KAUR SAXENA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Amit Grover, Advocate.

Cont. Cas.(C) 772/2013 & Ors. Page 3 of 29

versus

GAURAV SAXENA ….. Respondent

Through Ms.Mrinalini Khatri, Advocate.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 1147/2016

NAVEEN KUMAR JAIN ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.C.Rajaram with Mr.Sashi Panwar

and Mr.T.Kanniappan, Advocates.

versus

INDU JAIN ….. Respondent

Through Mr. Parvinder Chauhan, Advocate

with Mr. Nitin Jain, Advocate.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 1251/2016

VIKAS SHARMA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Atul Kharbanda, Advocate.

versus

SHALINI CHHABRA ….. Respondent

Through Mr.Jitendra Kumar Jha with

Mr.Rupam Roy, Advocates.

AND

+ CONT.CAS(C) 484/2014

DEEPAK BATRA ….. Petitioner

Through Mr.Akhilesh Aggarwal, Advocate.

Cont. Cas.(C) 772/2013 & Ors. Page 4 of 29

versus

SWATI BATRA ….. Respondent

Through

% Date of Decision: 09th January, 2017

 

 

Divorce on ground of wife’s cruel behavior.

. It is settled legal position that making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his relatives in the pleadings/complaints amount to causing mental cruelty. (Rel. (2014) 16 SCC 34 K. Srinivas Vs. K. Sunita).

It is a marriage which could not take off right from inception as the worst kind of mental cruelty was faced by the respondent/husband during his honeymoon and thereafter. All his efforts to save the marriage by arranging various meetings, visiting the parental home of the appellant/wife, agreeing to take a separate accommodation to keep her, statement by the mother-inlaw of the appellant/wife before CAW Cell that let them (parties to the marriage) live happily wherever they want, could not save this marriage. After she left the matrimonial home on April 03, 2004, for the last more than 12 years, she has been litigating not only against her husband and his family members but also do not hesitate to implicate the advocate for her husband in the criminal case as well Sh.Trilochan Singh, a neighbour of her husband.


MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 1 of 17

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: September 22, 2016

% Judgment Delivered on: September 30, 2016

+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 68/2015

 

ANU SETH ….. Appellant Represented by: Mr.S.K.Srivastava, Advocate with appellant in person.

versus

SUNIL SETH ….. Respondent Represented by: Mr.Kirti Uppal, Senior Advocate instructed by Mr.P.P.Tiwari and Ms.Sahiba Pantel, Advocates

 

. CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI PRATIBHA RANI, J.

  1. In the case of arranged marriages where both the spouses are in the age group of 30 plus, honeymoon period is the best time to know, understand and come close to each other. This case is an exception in the sense that just a day after the marriage the parties left for their honeymoon to Shimla and returned with bitter memories and a spoiled honeymoon.
  2. Before applying for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the respondent/husband has shown exceptional patience in dealing with the problem inspite of facing humiliation and scandalous allegations being made against him and his family members. The case is also different in a way that after staying intermittently at the matrimonial home, within less than three months of the marriage, the appellant/wife left for her parental home and despite the respondent/husband repeatedly visiting and persuading her to join him, she served detailed legal notice making various accusations. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 2 of 17
  3. Before replying the legal notice, again the respondent/husband tried to resolve the issues through their counsel by assuring of a separate accommodation for her on the assurance that none from their respective family would interfere for 5-6 months during that period. Even that did not succeed.
  4. When the complaint before CAW Cell was filed on May 26, 2005, the respondent/husband while requesting for a copy of the complaint to properly reply the same the concluding lines written by him are that : ‘I again request the authority to make her understand that marriage is solemnised to form the family and not to destroy the sanskar of marriage please.

’ 5. The respondent/husband had to beat a hasty retreat when FIR No.763/2005 under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC was registered on August 27, 2005 against him and his other family members including married sister and her husband (jija) and had to run for cover by applying for anticipatory bail. Unfortunately the counsel who applied and obtained anticipatory bail for the respondent/husband and his family from the Court of Law, was also in a soup when in a complaint under Domestic Violence Act, he was impleaded as respondent No.7 though he was in no way in domestic relationship with the appellant.

  1. The voluminous record in this case pertains to a marriage which lasted just for three months. The marriage was solemnised on January 31, 2004. The parties at the time of their marriage were quite mature. While the respondent/husband Sunil Seth was aged about 33 years, the appellant/wife Anu Seth was aged about 31 years at that time. Both are well qualified. The respondent/husband is employed in AIIMS as UDC and the appellant/wife is Graduate and also having vocational skills i.e. Diploma in Boutique Embroidery. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 3 of 17

 

  1. The differences started just a day after when the parties went to Shimla for their honeymoon on February 02, 2004. The reasons given by the parties for the unpleasant honeymoon are: (i) As per the respondent/husband, the appellant/wife did not allow him to consummate the marriage and tried her best to avoid him in the process. Not only that, she even threatened to commit suicide if he dare touch her body against her mood, willingness and consent. (ii) The appellant/wife’s stand is that while in Shimla the respondent/husband, who is short tempered and behaves cruelly and gets irritated if anything is said or done against his dictates, declared that the status of a lady in their family is that of ‘a sandal in a foot’ and his words to be treated as God’s words, an averment which did not find mention in the detailed legal notice sent by her on March 14, 2005.
  2. It is admitted case of the parties that after honeymoon when they returned to Delhi, the relationship was unlike a newlywed couple. The appellant/wife had been visiting her parents frequently. However, it is admitted case of the parties that they were behaving normally when both of them were together in Dehradun at the alleged Grehpravesh ceremony at the house of sister of the appellant/wife as well at Hoshiarpur to perform some puja at the behest of the appellant/wife of Mataji at Hoshiarpur i.e. spiritual Guru of wife’s family. Despite puja being performed by the parties at the behest of the appellant/wife and her parents, Mataji did not permit her to join the matrimonial home. It is admitted case of the parties that the appellant/wife left the matrimonial home on April 03, 2004 alongwith her parents at about 11.00 am. It is also not disputed that on April 05, 2004 the respondent/husband visited his wife to bring her back. Thereafter when she served a legal notice, efforts to reconcile were made by him through MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 4 of 17 respective advocates by holding chamber meetings. Private meetings between the two families to iron out the differences are also admitted by the parties.
  3. Litigation started when the appellant/wife filed a complaint on May 26, 2005 before CAW Cell and FIR No.763/2005 under Section 498-A/406/34 IPC was registered on August 27, 2005 against the respondent/husband and his family. The appellant/wife has also filed a complaint under Domestic Violence Act in January, 2007 wherein sister-inlaw (jethani) and Mr.Kehar Singh, Advocate for the respondent/husband in bail application were not even spared. A maintenance petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was also filed by the appellant/wife in January, 2007.
  4. On not being able to make her agreeable to join him, the respondent/husband filed divorce petition bearing HMA No. 1327/14/05 on the ground of cruelty which has been vigorously contested by the appellant/wife.
  5. Perusal of the impugned judgment shows that by referring to the contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses, she also filed application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. which has also been dismissed vide impugned judgment.
  6. Not only that PW-4 Sh.Trilochan Singh – a neighbour who mustered the courage to appear in the Court to depose what he had witnessed on April 03, 2004 when the appellant/wife finally left the matrimonial home in the company of her family members after allegedly creating a scene in the area was taken to task by her. PW-4 Sh.Trilochan Singh was served with the following notice by her through counsel in respect of the statement made by him before the Family Court:- ‘TRILOCHAN SINGHOCTOBER 20, 2008 SON OF LATE S. KIRPAL SINGH MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 5 of 17 39A, OLD SAHIBPURA, BHUPINDER SINGH NAGAR TILAK WaGAR, NEW DELHI Sir, I am legally wedded wife of Shri Sunil Seth, your neighbour. In the divorce-petition filed by my husband in the court of Shri P.K. Barthwal ADJ, Delhi, you appeared as witness of my husband, on 04- 09-2008 as PW 4. You had filed your affidavit dated 19-12-2007 in examination in chief. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit you stated that “I say that during the last week, o n Sunday of October 2004 about noon, the respondent along, with her parents and one person came to the house of the petitioner, they misbehaved with the family members of the petitioner and created a scene by shouting while standing on the road in front of my house and later on they went along with two suitcases. When the mother of the petitioner tried to pacify the matter, she was pushed and misbehaved very badly by the respondent.” WHEREAS in cross examination you stated that “No scene had been created outside my house. I had not witnessed any manhandling or scuffle at that time.” From the above it is clear that you, in order to support the case of my husband have deliberately, intentionally and knowingly deposed in the court falsely and misled the Hon’ble Court for which I intend to file petition under section 340 Cr.P.C. and other related sections. I call upon you to send reply to my letter. In your deposition, you named one Mrs.Gogi and Mr.Balwinder Singh, her husband but have not given- their address. I have inquired and came to know that there is no neighbour of my husband namely Mrs.Gogi and Mr.Balwinder Singh. I request you to send me the addresses of Mrs.Gogi and Mr.Balwinder Singh as I want to. call them in Court for deposition because you have informed all wrong things, to the Court. I hope you will reply my this letter otherwise I shall file application in MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 6 of 17 the Hon’ble court for appropriate action, under the law. (ARCHITA@ANUSETH) wife of Shri Sunil Seth H – 46, G.S. Apartments Sector-13, Rohini Delhi-110 085 C.C. – Shri Sunil Seth, with request to ask Mr. Trilochan Singh to furnish the required information in reply to my letter.’
  7. Written submissions have been filed by the parties mainly referring to the various discrepancies appearing in the statement of the witnesses and the evidence adduced by the parties.
  8. With a view to satisfy our judicial conscience about the correctness of the decision rendered by the Family Court granting divorce to the respondent/husband on the ground of cruelty, we will be examining only the following four incidents: (i) Filing criminal case in January, 2007 under Domestic Violence Act after about two years and nine months of leaving the matrimonial home in April, 2004 implicating her jethani Hemlata and Sh.Kehar Singh, Advocate, who represented her husband in bail matter by making false allegations. (ii) Malicious, scandalous and defamatory allegations made by the appellant/wife in the legal notice Ex.PW1/4 dated March 14, 2005 against her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law (jeth), married Nanand and Nandoi. (iii) Various threats being extended to the husband and his family to falsely implicate them to the extent that he was constrained to repeatedly report the matter to the police vide DDs Ex.PW2/1, Ex.PW3/1 & Ex.PW3/3. (iv) Making false allegations of dowry demand and demand of a car by the husband and in-laws. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 7 of 17
  9. Since all the contentions, as referred to the written submissions by the parties, have been dealt with by the learned Judge, Family Court in the lengthy judgment running into 86 pages, we will not repeat the same exercise by re-examining each and every accusation made by the parties against each other and their family members or the contradictions appearing on some aspects in the testimony of the witnesses.
  10. The accusations made above by the appellant/wife against her husband and in-laws have not been substantiated by any oral or documentary evidence.
  11. Perusal of certified copy of the Criminal Complaint Case No.66/1/07 filed on January 08, 2007 filed under Domestic Violence Act reveals that Sh.Kehar Singh Advocate has been impleaded as R-7 though he is not related to the parties. In the said complaint case, she levelled allegations against all the respondents about dowry demands being made and not bringing a car in dowry. She again referred to 3-4 marriages being performed by her jeth (R-3). Sh. Kehar Singh, Advocate was constrained to serve the appellant/wife with a legal notice through Sh.Prem P.Tiwari, Advocate demanding compensation of ₹10 lacs mentioning therein about the professional services rendered by him by filing anticipatory bail application on behalf of his clients namely Sunil Seth (respondent/husband) his mother Raj Seth, brother Anil Seth as well on behalf of Smt.Seema Rao and Sh.Balwant Rai (married Nanad and Nandoi) in case FIR No.763/2005 under Section 498-A/406/34 IPC, PS Prashant Vihar, which was granted. Para 4 of the notice by him served upon the appellant/wife reads as under:- “4. That you, feeling aggrieved with the professional obligations and duties discharged by my aforesaid client towards his abovesaid five clients, implicate him as a co-accused at serial No.7 in the complaint filed by you under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for the grant of relief under Section 18, MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 8 of 17 19 (i) (f), 20 and 22 of the said Act, with malafide intentions and ulterior motives to cause harassment and tarnish the image of my client at the Bar and in the society. You have intentionally and deliberately dragged my client in the aforesaid complaint without any basis under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which is now pending in the Court of Ms. Rekha, M.M. Rohini Courts, Delhi. In the said complaint all the allegations made by you against my client are totally false, frivolous, baseless, concocted and afterthought. My client has nothing to do with the allegations levelled by you in the said complaint against my client. It is submitted that my client has already submitted a detailed reply to the said complaint and has denied all the allegations in toto.”
  12. The legal notice Ex.PW1/4 dated March 14, 2005 sent by the appellant/wife which was addressed to (1) Sh.Sunil Seth, Husband; (2) Mrs.Raj Seth, Mother-in-law; (3) Mr.Anil Seth, Jeth; (4) Mrs.Simmy Rai, married Nanad; and (5) Mr.Balwant Rai, Nandoi. The relevant paragraphs of the said legal notice read as under:- “Paragraph No.3 “…….that the addressee No.3 have already left 3 wife and is now having 4th spouse namely Smt.Lata Seth. Smt.Lata Seth has been kept in dark to this effect for the reasons best known to you the above addressees. That you the addressee No.4 insisted for an Air conditioned car after the solemnisation of marriage on the pretext that addressee No.2 despite being widow has given 2 wheelar (sick wheeler) in the marriage of addressee No.4.” Paragraph No.10 “That you the addressees No. 2-4 & 5 have got no consideration of social values and are adament (sick adamant) to ruine (sick ruin) the mental peace and married life of my client. The addressee No.3 who is elder brother-in-law (Jeith of my client attempted to maline (sick malign) the modesty of my client but my client saved her sancitity (sick sanctity) from the ill attempts and designs of addressee No.3. My client brought to the knowledge of this incident to addressee No.1 but he ignored the same by saying that such things are common in their family and rebuked my client.” MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 9 of 17 Paragraph No.11 “That my client was harassed and humilated (sick humiliated) as well as physically and mentally by you all the addressees and compelled her to leave the matrimonail (matrimonial) home on 3.4.2004. Thereafter you the addressees No.2, 4 & 5 insisted my client to have divorce from the addressee No.1 so that the marriage of the addressee No.1 can be solemnised in a rich family. My client in order to collect some clothes went to the matrimonail (sick matrimonial) home on 4-5- 2004 and found that the steel almirah in not openable condition by its key. A key maker person was called who some how managed to open the almirah who stated that almirah’s lock have been damaged by some one, after opening the almirah it was to the utter surprise of my client that clothes, suits, sarees etc. were missing, the above addressees despite being asked avoided to give any reply and made my client a laughing stock, my client could not bear and returned back.”
  13. The respondent/husband has sent the reply Ex.PW1/5 dated May 02, 2005 wherein before replying to the accusations made in the legal notice, he has given the details of the various meetings and the proposed settlement terms which were initially agreed by the parties but subsequently she backed out on the issue of no interference by her family members at least for a period of six months in a rented accommodation.
  14. The two cases filed by the appellant/wife i.e. petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and petition under Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act have been dismissed. In the above proceedings in her cross examination the appellant/wife has admitted the following facts: Cross examination of Smt.Archita, petitioner dated 10.08.2011. “……It is correct that on 05.04.2004 my husband came to take me back in the matrimonial home but I refused. Vol. Because my husband had stated that his mother does not want to see her face and I want to take you in the rented accommodation because he has not taken any rented accommodation………” MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 10 of 17 Cross-examination of Smt.Archita, petitioner dated 14.10.2011. “I stayed in my matrimonial house from 1.2.04 till 3.4.04. I went for 2-3 days to Hoshiarpur with my husband for puja. I went to Honeymoon to Shimla from 2.2.04 to 07.02.04. It is correct that I had visited Dehradun at the place of my elder sister house from 28.3.04 till 30.3.04 along with my husband. It is correct that behavior of my husband was alright in the trip to Hoshiarpur and Dehradun but it is incorrect that his behavior was correct on our honeymoon. I have already mentioned about his misbehavior in honeymoon trip in my petition. It is correct that my husband had visited my parental home on 5.4.04 in order to take me along with him and he also came to take me on 13.2.05. It is wrong to suggest that respondent requested me with folded hands to accompany him but I refused. It is correct that before filing of litigation by either party efforts were made by the side of the respondent and his counsel to talk to me, my parents and my counsel for compromise of the matter. It is correct that on 23.3.05 respondent had offered me to take a premises on rent near his office ie AIIMS if I am ready and willing to live with him. It is also correct that when it was discussed that respondent will take premises on rent near AIIMMS it was also discussed that parents of both parties will not visit that home for about 5 months or 6 months. It is wrong to suggest that a fresh meeting was called on 31.3.05 for finalizing the compromise where my father refused to send me in rented accommodation. It is wrong to suggest that despite deciding that parents of both parties will not interfere in their lives my parents had interfered in our life. It is wrong to suggest that after meeting of 4.4.05 another meeting was called on 12.4.05 for settlement of the dispute. It is correct that in a petition filed by me before Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in 2009 I had admitted that I am still ready and willing to live with my husband. Q: I put to you that although you filed FIR against respondent u/s 498A/406 IPC but still you are willing and ready to live with him. Does it mean that your allegations are incorrect? Ans: I want to live with my husband as he has never demanded anything directly from me or my parents. I had filed the case of 498A against him and his family on the ground that whenever my mother in law and sister in law used to demand anything my husband (respondent) used to remain silent. Within two months of living with him I could not have understood his nature completely. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 11 of 17 It is wrong to suggest that whenever my husband had tried to take me with him I had refused on the ground that till the time Puja (Mataji) of our Guru in Hoshiapur is done and she allows me to go I will not go with him. It is wrong to suggest that I have submitted so in my statement in case before Ld. MM dealing with DV case. It is wrong to suggest that whenever my husband approached to take me with him my parents and my family members threatened him by saying that they have approached to higher levels and respondent will have to face the consequences. I had not stated before any Court that I do not want to go with my husband. At this stage witness is confronted with certified copy of her statement EX. PW-1/RX given on 15.09.10 in the case had not stated before any court that I do not want to go with my husband. At this stage witness is confronted with certified copy of Archita vs Sunil in D.V. Case from point A to A………….” “……….. It is correct that husband had never demanded car from me. Vol but he has demanded car from my father when he met him in India Gate meeting. I had inquired from the office of elder brother of respondent about his various marriages, I came to know from Mr Jain who is owner of Enkay Rubber co. that brother of respondent had married 3-4 times………..” Cross-examination of Archita, Petitioner dated 16.11.2011 “I have stated before the Hon’ble High Court in my petition that I am ready to live with my husband without any pre-condition. Just immediate after my marriage, I had gone to my matrimonial home. I was happy with my husband in my matrimonial home. My husband is not smoking or drinking. Respondent had never beaten me and I am confident that I will live happily with my husband in the matrimonial home. My mother in law has also stated in writing in CAW Cell to wish the couple to live happily………..”
  15. In the complaint case bearing No.66/1/07 filed under Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act the appellant/wife impleaded her jethani Hemlata also as respondent despite the fact that prior to that there was no accusation against her in any regard. We have already noted that even Mr.Kehar Singh, Advocate who was a counsel at the time of seeking anticipatory bail was MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 12 of 17 impleaded as respondent. The petition under Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act has been dismissed on April 29, 2016 for the following reasons: “8. Considering the testimony of complainant which has many contradictions, at one stage complainant has admitted that no act of cruelty committed upon her and that she had cordial relationship with the respondent till she resided at the matrimonial house. It is also admitted by her that incident of Tatapani were not raised in the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and has been raised first time in the present petition. 9. With respect to respondent no. 2 to 7, there is no specific allegation either in the complaint nor in the petition filed by the complainant. With respect to respondent no.2 only allegation has been made that she had demanded AC car and gold bangles and the allegations are undated and not specific despite her short stay at her matrimonial house. Accordingly, complainant has failed to prove that she is an aggrieved person qua respondents no. 2 to 7. 10.With respect to respondent no.1 she has also admitted that only grievance against respondent no. 1 is that he has filed several complaints against her family and threw her against the wall on 03.04.2004, however the said allegations neither mentioned in the affidavit in evidence nor in the petition showing that it is an afterthought.” 22. Vide order dated May 07, 2015 the Petition No.202/2014 filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by the appellant/wife was dismissed inter-alia for the following reasons: “40. The petitioner has failed to show that she has sufficient cause for living separately and therefore, is not entitled to any maintenance u/s 125 Cr.PC in any case, she is a graduate and vocationally qualified, but if she chooses to while away her life in motivated prosecution, the respondent cannot be burdened to make payment for such sadistic conduct of the petitioner. Therefore, it is held that the petitioner is not entitled to any maintenance from the respondent. Issue no.1 is accordingly, decided in favour of the respondent and MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 13 of 17 against the petitioner. ISSUE No.2 RELIEF 41.In view of my findings above on issue no.1, the petition of the petitioner u/w 125 Cr.PC is dismissed. No orders as to costs.”
  16. In the affidavit Ex.RW1/1 by way of evidence filed by the appellant/wife in HMA Petition No.771/2006 her version in paras 20, 23, 26 to 28 is as under:- “20. I also state that at the instance of my husband, my father and brother met the petitioner at India Gate and during the course of meeting my husband, his sister and her husband raised vague and indefinite issues and made false allegations against me. My husband further stated that he finds it difficult to go to his office without car and my father declined to fulfil the said demand of A.C. Car. The sister of the petitioner openly asked my father that in case they are not ready to fulfil the said demand, they would break the marriage as her elder brother had married four times and there was no problem in getting divorce as her brother got divorce two-three times from the court and they are acquainted with the process of the court.”

“23. I also state that on 22.11.2004 at about 8 PM or on 10.1.2005 at 6.45 as alleged or otherwise, I, my father and my brother met the petitioner and his brother and misbehaved with them by using derogatory and filthy language and/or threatened. I also state that the petitioner is a very clever person who in order to create evidence against me is misusing the process of law and has been accustomed to lodge false report with the Police Station with ulterior motives and till date no action has been taken by the police against me or my family members considering the complaint to be false and baseless.” “26. I further state that I have been deserted by my husband without any reasonable cause and excuse and forgetting about the happening of the past, I am ready to join my matrimonial home provided my husband assures me of the affectionate attitude and proper living at the matrimonial home. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 14 of 17 27. I state that the FIR bearing No.763/2005 was got registered by me for the valid and cogent reasons being the fact that I was treated with utmost cruelty on account of non fulfillment of dowry demands inasmuch as the behaviour of my husband and his family members caused mental and physical cruelty to me, resulting into ruining my life. 28. I further state that I have also filed an application U/s.125 Cr.P.C. alongwith an interim application for maintenance, besides the filing of the petition U/s.12 of the Domestic Violence Act, and the same are pending adjudication before Ms.Shunali Gupta, M.M. Delhi. The certified copies of both the petitions are Ex.RW-1/9 and RW- 1/10 respectively.”

  1. So far as various threats being extended to the respondent/husband and his family members to implicated them in a false case are concerned, DD No.23A dated October 05, 2004 marked as Ex.PW3/1 was recorded at the instance of the husband at 6:15 PM at PS Rajouri Garden about threat being extended by his wife at Vishal Cinema as well the threats earlier being extended for the previous six months on phone by the appellant/wife and her father that by using political influence they would ruin the respondent/husband and complaints would be made against him in the women cell. DD No.27 dated November 22, 2004 at PS Rajouri Garden Ex.PW3/2 is about threats given to the husband at Bikaner Sweets by the father and brother of his wife to ruin him and his family. The third report was registered vide DD No.18A dated January 10, 2005 at PS Tilak Nagar marked as PW-2/1 whereby he was asked either to pay `5 lakhs or he and his entire family would be implicated in some case/CAW cell.
  2. It may be noted here that demand of air conditioned car was earlier attributed to only Smt.Seema (married Nanad) in the legal notice Ex.PW1/4 dated March 14, 2005 whereas during trial of HMA Petition No.771/2006 MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 15 of 17 this demand was made by her husband from her father and during the meeting at India Gate where she was not even present

. 26. The appellant/wife has also placed on record the transcript Ex.RW1/5 of the conversations dated 05.05.2004, 30.06.2004, 20.12.2004, 19.03.2005, 18.05.2005, 25.07.2005, 27.07.2005, 09.09.2005 and 23.01.2006 between the parties/family members.

  1. The learned Judge, Family Court has referred to this conversation in paras 69 and 72 to 85 of the impugned judgment. After referring to the above telephonic conversation which was consciously recorded by the appellant/wife or at her instance without other party being aware that the conversation between the two is being tape recorded to be used in litigation, was still found lacking in proving the plea taken by the appellant/wife or the accusations made by her against her husband and in law. Referring to the conversation, in para 69 finding has been returned by the learned Judge, Family Court that the appellant/wife left the matrimonial home of her own with her family member.
  2. The allegations repeatedly made in the legal notice, written statement and other proceedings against jeth that he tried to molest her and that when it was brought to the notice of the husband, he said that it was a family culture, remained unproved. The allegation made that the jeth had married 3-4 times also remained unproved. When his wife appeared Hemlata in the witness box as PW-3, no such question was put to her. The admissions made by the appellant/wife during her cross examination in the proceedings under Domestic Violence Act extracted above shows that it was not a case of dowry demand. The meeting at India Gate on October 03, 2004 when she claimed that the car was demanded by her husband from her father is falsified from her own version recorded in the criminal cases filed by her. MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 16 of 17 Otherwise also it is highly improbable that after so many meetings in Lawyer’s chamber, at personal level and other places and lot of bitterness being created after she finally left on April 03, 2004, the husband could have demanded a car from her father during meeting at India Gate fixed to save the marriage. One thing is clear from this admission of the appellant/wife that prior to that there was no demand of car though false allegation was made about this demand in the legal notice dated March 14, 2005.
  3. In view of above admitted position as well judicial findings in the cases filed by the appellant/wife herein, the respondent/husband was able to establish that during their honeymoon not only consummation of marriage was resisted by her, even thereafter causing embarrassment and humiliation accusations have been made against him and his entire family. The allegations made against his elder brother by the complainant that he tried to molest her by way of serving a legal notice and also filing complaints implicating not only the husband but his entire family including his married sister and brother-in-law as well his counsel, with a motive to harass them, is nothing but a ruthless act on the part of the appellant/wife to cause mental cruelty and harassment to her husband and his family. It is settled legal position that making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his relatives in the pleadings/complaints amount to causing mental cruelty. (Rel. (2014) 16 SCC 34 K. Srinivas Vs. K. Sunita).
  4. From the admissions of the appellant/wife during her cross examination, we have no hesitation to hold that the respondent/husband and his entire family had been subjected to worst kind of mental cruelty by the appellant/wife in this case. In all judicial proceedings, her projection as a victim at the hands of her husband and in-laws or being subjected to cruelty has been disbelieved. The learned Judge, Family Court had given valid MAT.APP. (F.C.) 68/2015 Page 17 of 17 reasons for dissolution of marriage on the issue of cruelty by discussing each and every contention thread bare in the impugned judgment.
  5. It is a marriage which could not take off right from inception as the worst kind of mental cruelty was faced by the respondent/husband during his honeymoon and thereafter. All his efforts to save the marriage by arranging various meetings, visiting the parental home of the appellant/wife, agreeing to take a separate accommodation to keep her, statement by the mother-inlaw of the appellant/wife before CAW Cell that let them (parties to the marriage) live happily wherever they want, could not save this marriage. After she left the matrimonial home on April 03, 2004, for the last more than 12 years, she has been litigating not only against her husband and his family members but also do not hesitate to implicate the advocate for her husband in the criminal case as well Sh.Trilochan Singh, a neighbour of her husband.
  6. We are of the considered opinion that the conduct of the appellant/wife in the instant case was such that it was not possible for the husband to bear such type of cruelty

. 33. The appeal has no merits and the same is hereby dismissed.

  1. No costs.
  2. LCR be sent back alongwith copy of this order.

PRATIBHA RANI (JUDGE)

PRADEEP NANDRAJOG (JUDGE)

SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 ‘st’

dissolution of marriage/Divorce/Annulment/Separation/divorce by mutual consent under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

Divorce can be sought by husband or wife on certain grounds, including: continuous period of desertion for two or more years, conversion to a religion other than Hindu, mental abnormality, venereal disease, and leprosy.  Newly married couples cannot file a petition for divorce within one year of marriage.

This Act may be called the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir 1 , and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories.

 Application of Act. —

 This Act applies—

(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj,

(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and

(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.

Explanation. —The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be:—

(a) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;

(b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and

(c) any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.

(3) The expression “Hindu” in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section. State Amendment Pondicherry: In section 2, insert the following sub-section:— “(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the Renoncants of the Union territory of Pondicherry

Conditions for a Hindu marriage. —A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—

(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;

2 [(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party—

(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or

(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or

(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity 3 [***];]

(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of 4 [twenty-one years] and the bride, the age of 5 [eighteen years] at the time of the marriage;

(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;

(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;

Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage. —

(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.

(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the saptpadi (that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. State Amendments Section 7A Pondicherry: After section 7, insert the following section, namely:—

(a) by each party to the marriage declaring in any language understood by the parties that each takes the other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband; or

(b) by each party to the marriage garlanding the other or putting a ring upon any finger of the other; or

(c) by the tying of the thali.

Restitution of conjugal rights.

When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. 8 [ Explanation. —Where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.

Judicial separation .—

(1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 13, and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which a petition for divorce might have been presented.]

(2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.

Void marriages.

—Any marriage solemnised after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto 11 [against the other party], be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses

(i) , (iv) and (v) of section 5.

Voidable marriages .—

(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:—

12 [(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent; or]

(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of section 5; or

(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner 13 [was required under section 5 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978 (2 of 1978)*], the consent of such guardian was obtained by force 14 [or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent]; or

(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage—

(a) on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained if—

(i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or

(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered;

(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied—

(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;

(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnised after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and

(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of 15 [the said ground].

Divorce. —

(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—

(i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or]

(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or]

(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or]

(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or

(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

Explanation .—In this clause,—

(a) the expression “mental disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;

(b) the expression “psychopathic disorder” means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or]

(iv) has 18 [***] been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or

(v) has 18 [***] been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or

(vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or

(vi) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; 19 [***] 20 [ Explanation. —In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.] 21 [***]

(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground—

(i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 22 [one year] or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or

(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 22 [one year] or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.]

(2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground,—

(i) in the case of any marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage of the petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition; or

(ii) that the husband has, since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or 23 [bestiality; or]

(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) [or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)], a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards; or

(iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnised before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.]

 Divorce by mutual consent. —

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976)*, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.]

 

 

 

 

Mutual Consent Divorce under sec.13-B of HMA can be withdraw any time.

. In the present case, no petition under Section 13-B of the Act has been filed. The petitioner wants for a decree in divorce suit under Section 13 of the Act, in view of compromise dated 10.10.2014, as this compromise would operate as estoppel against the respondents. Rule of estoppel is a rule of evidence. There can be no estoppel against statute. Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545, held that it is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised.. Section 13-B itself gives liberty for second thought to the parties. The consent must continue during the interregnum period and after this period the parties should again confirm their consent before the Court. As held by Supreme Court in various cases cited above, the parties can withdraw their consent during this period. As such Rule of estoppel has no application in a petition under Section 13-B of the Act.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of  Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, (2011) 5 SCC 234, held that the language employed in Section 13-B(2) of the Act is clear. The court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met:
(a) A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months;
(b) After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
(c) The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree.
In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the section, as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties. In other words, unless there is a complete agreement between husband and wife for the dissolution of the marriage and unless the court is completely satisfied, it cannot grant a decree for divorce by mutual consent. Otherwise, in our view, the expression “divorce by mutual consent” would be otiose.


 

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

AFR
Court No. – 58 Reserved

Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. – 7414 of 2015
Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Srivastava
Respondent :-Smt. Ankita Srivastava
Counsel for Petitioner :-Siddhartha Varma, Anup Kumar Srivastava, S.K. Varma
Counsel for Respondent:- Dhirendra Pratap Singh, H.M.B. Sinha

Hon’ble Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J.
1. Heard Sri S.K. Varma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Siddhartha Varma, for the petitioner and Sri H.M.B. Sinha along with Sri Dhirendra Pratap Singh, for the respondent.
2. This petition has been filed for setting aside the order of Principal Judge Family Court dated 08.10.2015, deferring disposal of application (28-C) filed by the petitioner and fixing a date for framing issues in Divorce Suit and to issue direction to Principal Judge Family Court, to decree Divorce Suit in view of compromise dated 10.10.2014, entered into between the parties.
3. Ashish Kumar Srivastava (the petitioner) married to Smt. Ankita Srivastava (the respondent) according to Hindu rites on 17.05.2011. The petitioner filed a suit on 26.05.2012 (registered as Divorce Suit No. 321 of 2012) under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for grant of decree of divorce. It is alleged that in retaliation to this suit, the respondent initiated following proceedings against the petitioner and his family members:-
(I) Criminal Case No. 721 of 2012, arising out of Case Crime No. 270 of 2012 under Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, PS Shahpur, district Gorakhpur.
(II) Case No. 564 of 2012 under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
(III) Case No. 39 of 2013 under Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(IV) Case No. 116 of 2013 U/S. 406 IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
(V) Case No. 1393 of 2013 under Section 323, 504, 506, 379 IPC.
(VI) Case Crime No. 116 of 2013 under Section 504, 506 IPC
(VII) Matrimonial Suit No. 712 of 2013 under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act.
4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (registered as Criminal Misc. Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 425 of 2013) for quashing, entire proceeding of Criminal Case No. 721 of 2012, under Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, PS Shahpur, district Gorakhpur. This Court vide order dated 18.01.2013 referred the dispute to Mediation and Conciliation Center., Allahabad. The parties settled their dispute before Mediator, who submitted report dated 11.09.2013. Under the settlement the petitioner had to pay Rs. 18,00,000/- as one time permanent alimony to the respondent and permit her to take ornament from bank locker. After compliance of this condition, the respondents agreed to withdraw all the complaints and suit filed by her. Divorce Suit No. 321 of 2011 has to be decreed. When the case was listed before this Court on 09.09.2014, the petitioner took time for payment of aforesaid amount as such 09.10.2014 was fixed before this Court. On 09.10.2014, the petitioner gave two bank drafts of Rs. 18,00,000/- in favour of the respondents in Court. The case was adjourned for 10.10.2014 in order to enable the parties to file written compromise. On 10.10.2014, the parties filed joint affidavit in the shape of compromise, incorporating aforementioned terms. Both the parties appeared before the Court on 10.10.2004 and filed joint affidavit in shape of compromise. Two bank drafts of Rs. 18,00,000/- was handed over to the respondent by the Court. Criminal Misc. Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 425 of 2013 was allowed and Criminal Case No. 721 of 2012 was quashed by order dated 10.10.2014.
5. The petitioner filed an application (18-C) dated 22.10.2014, before Principal Judge Family Court, for decreeing Divorce Suit No. 321 of 2012 in view of the compromise dated 10.10.2014, the aforesaid. The respondent filed an application before this Court for recalling order dated 10.10.2014. When application (18-C) came for hearing before Principal Judge Family Court, the respondent raised an objection that as she had filed an application for recalling order dated 10.10.2014 as such disposal of application (18-C) be postponed. On which Principal Judge Family Court did hear the application (18-C) on 07.01.2015. This Court by order dated 24.07.2015 rejected the recall application filed by the respondent for recalling the order dated 10.10.2014.
6. Then the petitioner filed another application (28-C) dated 30.07.2015, before Principal Judge Family Court, for decreeing Divorce Suit No. 321 of 2012 in view of the compromise dated 10.10.2014, the aforesaid, stating therein that recall application filed by the respondent has been rejected. By the impugned order dated 08.10.2015, disposal of this application was deferred holding that divorce on compromise can only be granted according to provisions of Section 13-B and not in proceeding under Section 13 of the Act. The petitioner filed an appeal (registered as First Appeal No. 596 of 2015) under Section 19 of Family Court Act, 1984, against aforesaid order which was dismissed by order dated 18.11.2015 on the ground that the order dated 08.10.2015 was an interlocutory order and the appeal was not maintainable. Hence, this petition has been filed.
7. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 28 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides for mutual divorce. Legislature thought it proper to provide more easy procedure of divorce to Hindus also. By Act No. 68 of 1976, Section 13-B was added under of the Act which provided divorce by mutual consent. Thereafter, Family Court Act, 1984 was enacted. Section 9 of Act, 1984 castes a statutory duty upon Family Courts to persuade the parties to settle their dispute in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. By virtue of Section 10 of the Act, 1984, entire provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been applied to the proceeding before Family Court. Thus provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. is applicable in the proceeding before Family Court. A combined reading of provisions of Section 9 and 10 of the Act, 1984 makes it clear that Family Court at first instance will persuade the parties to settle their dispute in respect of the subject-matter of the suit and if such settlement is arrived then they can file a compromise before Family Court in the suit and suit can be decided in terms of compromise. The suit for divorce under Section 13 of the Act, 1955 is not an exception to the application to Section 9 and 10 of the Act, 1984. As such suit for divorce can also be decided in terms of compromise. Phrase “Subject to the provisions of this Act” used under Section 13-B means in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act. The compromise operates as estoppel against the parties to it as held by Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammal Vs. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593. The compromise dated 10.10.2014 was duly signed by the parties and verified by this Court in presence of the parties. It is a lawful compromise and has been acted upon in part. The respondent took Rs. 18,00,000/- and ornaments from locker as agreed under this compromise. She had taken benefit of compromise. It is an estoppel by deed as well as estoppel by record. She is now estopped from raising objection that suit for divorce cannot be decreed in terms of compromise, as held by Supreme Court in S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai, AIR 1972 SC 2059. This Court in Jodhey Vs. State AIR 1952 SC 788 held that High Court has unlimited judicial power. This compromise can be treated as “family settlement”. It acknowledges right and liability of the parties and can be enforced under the law as held by Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das Vs. Mukund Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481. This Court in Jokhan Vs. Ram Deo, AIR 1967 All 212 has held that the compromise cannot be ignored only for the reason that compromise was entered before the Court which has no jurisdiction. Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, held that power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution is also available to High Court for doing compete justice between the parties. Family Court placed reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Sanjeeta Das Vs. Tapan Kumar Mohanti, (2010) 10 SCC 222. This judgment has not taken any notice of Section 9 and 10 of Family Court Act, 1984 as such it is per-incuriam and does not lay binding precedent as held by Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Synthetins and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139. Otherwise also in this case, there was no clause for divorce in the compromise. This Court in Indrawal Vs. Radhey Ram, AIR 1981 All 151 and Supreme Court in Dr. (Mrs) Leena Roy Vs. Dr. Subrato Roy, AIR 1991 SC 92 and Raj Kumar Rana Vs. Rita Rathore, AIR 2015 SC 2668, decreed divorce petition under Section 13 of the Act, on compromise. Impugned order is illegal and liable to be set aside and Family Court is liable to be directed to decree the divorce suit in view of compromise dated 10.10.2014.
8. I have considered the arguments of counsel for the parties and examined the record. Old Hindu law did not allow divorce amongst Hindus of upper communities. In communities of lower strata of Hindus, custom relating to divorce was prevalent. After independence, Special Marriage Act, 1954 was enacted, which is applied to persons whose marriage was performed and registered under that Act for divorce. Section 27 provides for divorce and Section 28 provides for mutual divorce under this Act. Thereafter, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was enacted and provisions relating to divorce was provided under Section 13 for all the Hindus and its sub-sect. Thereafter, legislature thought to provide more easy procedure of divorce to Hindus. By Act No. 68 of 1976, Section 13-B was added under of the Act which provided divorce by mutual consent. Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC 301, held that once the marriage has been solemnized among Hindus then it cannot be dissolved, except on the grounds enumerated in Section 13, of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or according to Section 13-B. Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is quoted below:-
13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.–(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.]

9. Aim and object of enactment of Family Court Act, 1984 was to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. Under Section 7 of this Act, jurisdiction of Family Court was conferred to exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation to Section 7 of the Act. Thus Family Court has to exercise same jurisdiction, which is exercisable by the Court under the law. Thus it is clear that if a petition is filed under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, then Family Court will exercise jurisdiction that Act only. So far as application of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is concerned, procedure provided under it has to be followed for exercising jurisdiction Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In case of contradiction, provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would have overriding effect. The counsel for the petitioner relied upon Section 9 and 10, of Family Court Act, 1984 which are quoted below:-
9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement.– (1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit of proceeding and for this purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit.
(2) If, in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it appears to the Family Court that there is a reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Family Court may adjourn the proceedings for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement.
(3) The power conferred by sub-section (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other power of the Family Court to adjourn the proceedings.
10. Procedure generally.–(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings (other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) (2 of 1974), before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have all the powers of such court.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the rules made there under, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one Party and denied by the other.
20. Act to have overriding effect.–The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

10. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that although Act, 1984 has an overriding effect but Section 7 of the Act provides for Family Court to exercise jurisdiction conferred under the Act, in which petitions enumerated in Explanation to Section 7 have been filed. For trial of suit for divorce under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Family Court has to follow the procedure of C.P.C. but decree of divorce can be granted only on the grounds enumerated under Section 13 of the Act. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides two modes for divorce namely (i) on the grounds mentioned under Section 13 of the Act or (ii) on mutual consent for which a petition has to be presented by both the parties to the marriage and after interregnum period of six they again attorn their consent before the Court. It is well settled principle that when the statute provides a particular procedure for doing an act then the act has to be done according to that procedure and not at all. In this respect judgment of Supreme Court in K.S. Saini Vs. H.C. Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 may be referred.
11. Issue as the whether consent given at the initial stage for divorce can be withdrawn at the later stage came for consideration before Supreme Court in Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25, in which it has been held that from the analysis of the section, it will be apparent that the filing of the petition with mutual consent does not authorise the court to make a decree for divorce. There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party to the joint motion under sub-section (2). There is nothing in the section which prevents such course. The section does not provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both. The High Courts of Bombay and Delhi have proceeded on the ground that the crucial time for giving mutual consent for divorce is the time of filing the petition and not the time when they subsequently move for divorce decree. This approach appears to be untenable. At the time of the petition by mutual consent, the parties are not unaware that their petition does not by itself snap marital ties. They know that they have to take a further step to snap marital ties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is clear on this point. It provides that “on the motion of both the parties. … if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall … pass a decree of divorce …”. What is significant in this provision is that there should also be mutual consent when they move the court with a request to pass a decree of divorce. Secondly, the court shall be satisfied about the bona fides and the consent of the parties. If there is no mutual consent at the time of the enquiry, the court gets no jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the view is otherwise, the court could make an enquiry and pass a divorce decree even at the instance of one of the parties and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot be regarded as decree by mutual consent.
Sub-section (2) requires the court to hear the parties which means both the parties. If one of the parties at that stage says that “I have withdrawn my consent”, or “I am not a willing party to the divorce”, the court cannot pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. If the court is held to have the power to make a decree solely based on the initial petition, it negates the whole idea of mutuality and consent for divorce. Mutual consent to the divorce is a sine qua non for passing a decree for divorce under Section 13-B. Mutual consent should continue till the divorce decree is passed. It is a positive requirement for the court to pass a decree of divorce. “The consent must continue to decree nisi and must be valid subsisting consent when the case is heard”.

12. Again a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of Supreme Court in Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338, held that we are of the view that it is only on the continued mutual consent of the parties that a decree for divorce under Section 13-B of the said Act can be passed by the court. If petition for divorce is not formally withdrawn and is kept pending then on the date when the court grants the decree, the court has a statutory obligation to hear the parties to ascertain their consent. From the absence of one of the parties for two to three days, the court cannot presume his/her consent as has been done by the learned Family Court Judge in the instant case and especially in its fact situation, discussed above.
In our view it is only the mutual consent of the parties which gives the court the jurisdiction to pass a decree for divorce under Section 13-B. So in cases under Section 13-B, mutual consent of the parties is a jurisdictional fact. The court while passing its decree under Section 13-B would be slow and circumspect before it can infer the existence of such jurisdictional fact. The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent. Same view has been taken in Sanjeeta Das v. Tapan Kumar Mohanty, (2010) 10 SCC 222, in which it has been held that more importantly, the consent of the parties is of no relevance in the matter. No court can assume jurisdiction to dissolve a Hindu marriage simply on the basis of the consent of the parties dehors the grounds enumerated under Section 13 of the Act, unless of course the consenting parties proceed under Section 13-B of the Act.
13. Supreme Court in Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, (2011) 5 SCC 234, held that the language employed in Section 13-B(2) of the Act is clear. The court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met:
(a) A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months;
(b) After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
(c) The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree.
In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the section, as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties. In other words, unless there is a complete agreement between husband and wife for the dissolution of the marriage and unless the court is completely satisfied, it cannot grant a decree for divorce by mutual consent. Otherwise, in our view, the expression “divorce by mutual consent” would be otiose.
14 In Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, (2011) 5 SCC 234, it has also been held that the power under Article 142 of the Constitution is plenipotentiary. However, it is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution with implicit trust and faith and, therefore, extraordinary care and caution has to be observed while exercising this jurisdiction. Even if the chances are infinitesimal for the marriage to survive, it is not for this Court to use its power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage as having broken down irretrievably.
15. In the present case, no petition under Section 13-B of the Act has been filed. The petitioner wants for a decree in divorce suit under Section 13 of the Act, in view of compromise dated 10.10.2014, as this compromise would operate as estoppel against the respondents. Rule of estoppel is a rule of evidence. There can be no estoppel against statute. Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545, held that it is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised.. Section 13-B itself gives liberty for second thought to the parties. The consent must continue during the interregnum period and after this period the parties should again confirm their consent before the Court. As held by Supreme Court in various cases cited above, the parties can withdraw their consent during this period. As such Rule of estoppel has no application in a petition under Section 13-B of the Act.
16. In view of aforesaid discussions, this petition has no merit and is dismissed.
Order Date :- 8.4.2016
Jaideep/-

HOW TO GET A DIVORCE IN INDIA

29_12_2013-divorce29_s

India has different divorce laws for different religions. Almost all the religions has their own divorce laws in India which are used among themselves. There are separate laws for inter-cast or inter-religion marriages. Divorce laws in India for Hindus is described in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Hindu Marriage Act is also used for Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains as they don’t have their own separate marriage and divorce laws. Here is the list of various divorce laws in India for various religions:

Hindu (including Sikhs, Jains and Buddists) : Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Muslims : Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939

Christians : Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Parsis : The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

Inter-Cast of Inter-Religion : Special Marriage Act, 1954

The Indian Divorce, Act Special Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, provide for annulment of the marriage, since its very inception, on grounds such as the non-fulfillment of mandatory conditions.. The Indian Divorce act requires confirmation by the High Court to come into effect.

Grounds for Divorce in India

In India divorce is granted mainly on 4 different grounds.

  1. Adultery
  2. Desertion
  3. Cruelty
  4. Impotency
  5. Chronic Diseases

 

Contested Divorce under Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Divorce. —

(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—

16 [(i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or]

16 [(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or]

16 [(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or]

(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or

17 [(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

Explanation .—In this clause,—

(a) the expression “mental disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;

(b) the expression “psychopathic disorder” means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or]

(iv) has 18 [***] been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or

(v) has 18 [***] been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or

(vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or

(vi) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; 19 [***] 20 [ Explanation. —In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.]

Mutual Consent Divorce under Hindu Marriage Act.

mutual divorce

Divorce by Mutual Consent

Seeking a divorce in India is a long-drawn out legal affair, where the period of prosecution takes a minimum of six months. However, the time and money required to obtain a divorce can be considerably shortened if the couple seeks divorce by mutual consent. In this case, estranged spouses can mutually agree to a settlement and file for a “no-fault divorce” under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. All marriages which have been solemnized before or after the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 1976, are entitled to make use of the provision of divorce by mutual consent. However, for filing for a divorce on this ground, it is necessary for the husband and wife to have lived separately for at least a year.

Sec.13-B of Hindu Marriage Act 1955- Divorce by mutual consent.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the mean time, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.

Procedure for Filing for Divorce

The procedure for seeking a divorce by mutual consent, is initiated by filing a petition, supported by affidavits from both partners, in the district court. Known as the First Motion Petition for Mutual Consent Divorce, this should contain a joint statement by both partners, that due to their irreconcilable differences, they can no longer stay together and should be granted a divorce by the court. After six months, the Second Motion Petition for Mutual Consent Divorce should be filed by the couple and they are required reappear in the court. A gap of six months is given between the two motions, so as to offer the estranged couple adequate time to reconsider their decision of dissolving their marriage. After hearings from the husband and wife, if the judge is satisfied that all the necessary grounds and requirements for the divorce have been met, the couple is granted a mutual divorce decree. Some of the important issues on which the couple should have agreed, in their petition for divorce by mutual consent, are custody of child, alimony to wife, return of dowry items or “streedhan” and litigation expenses.

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE UNDER HINDU MARRIAGE ACT:

marriage

There are two ways to legally end a marriage – annulment and divorce. An annulment is a legal procedure which cancels a marriage between a man and a woman. Annulling a marriage is as though it is completely erased – legally, it declares that the marriage never technically existed and was never valid. A divorce, or legal dissolution of a marriage, is the ending of a valid marriage between a man and a woman returning both parties to single status with the ability to remarry. While each individual state has its own laws regarding the grounds for an annulment or for a divorce, certain requirements apply nationwide.

An annulment case can be initiated by either the husband or the wife in the marriage. The party initiating the annulment must prove that he or she has the grounds to do so and if it can be proven, the marriage will be considered null and void by the court. The following is a list of common grounds for annulment and a short explanation of each point:

Bigamy – either party was already married to another person at the time of the marriage
Forced Consent – one of the spouses was forced or threatened into marriage and only entered into it under duress.

Fraud – one of the spouses agreed to the marriage based on the lies or misrepresentation of the other.

Marriage Prohibited By Law – Marriage between parties that based on their familial relationship is considered incestuous.

Mental Illness – either spouse was mentally ill or emotionally disturbed at the time of the marriage.

Mental Incapacity – either spouse was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the marriage and was unable to make informed consent.

Inability to Consummate Marriage –
 either spouse was physically incapable of having sexual relations or impotent during the marriage.

Underage Marriage – either spouse was too young to enter into marriage without parental consent or court approval.

Depending on your state of residence, a divorce can be much more complicated than an annulment. Like annulment cases, each state has its own set of laws regarding divorce. In most divorce cases, marital assets are divided and debts are settled. If the marriage has produced children, a divorce proceeding determines custody of the children, visitation rights and spousal and child support issues.

Each state can have either a “no-fault” divorce or a “fault” divorce. A no-fault divorce allows the dissolution of a legal marriage with neither spouse being named the “guilty party” or the cause for the marital break-up.

Many states now offer the “no-fault” divorce option, a dissolution of a legal marriage in which neither party accepts blame for the marital break-up. In the absence of a “guilty party,” some states require a waiting period of a legal separation before a no-fault divorce can take place. For this reason, in addition to cases where one spouse wishes to assign blame, some parties seek to expedite the legal process by pursuing a traditional, “fault” divorce.

A “fault” divorce is only granted when one spouse can prove adequate grounds. Like an annulment, these grounds vary from state to state, however, there are some overarching commonalities. These guidelines often include addition to drugs, alcohol or gambling, incurable mental illness, and conviction of a crime. The major grounds for divorce that apply in every state are listed below:
Adultery – one or both spouses engages in extramarital relationships with others during the marriage.

Desertion – one spouse abandons the other, physically and emotionally, for a lengthy period of time.

Physical/Emotional Abuse – one spouse subjects the other to physical or violent attacks or emotional or psychological abuse such as abusive language, and threats of physical violence.

Your state law and particular situation will determine whether or not your annulment or divorce will be simple or complex. Familiarizing yourself with the laws for your particular state is the best way to learn what your rights are in the case of a marital dissolution.

Nullity of marriage and divorce:- Void marriages Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v), Section 5. 12. Voidable.

Marriages.-(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:-
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotency of the respondent; or

(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of Section 5; or

(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was required under Section 5 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent; or

(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage-

(a) on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained if-

(i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered ; or

(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered;

(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied-

(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;

(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and

(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground.

 

What is a marriage annulment?

There are two ways to legally end a marriageannulment and divorce. An annulment is a legal procedure which cancels a marriage between a man and a woman. Annulling a marriage is as though it is completely erased – legally, it declares that the marriage never technically existed and was never valid.

What Is Annulment Of Marriage

In strict Legal terminology, annulment refers only to making a voidable marriage null;if the marriage is void ab initio, then it is automatically null, although a legal declaration of nullity is required to establish this.

Annulment is a legal procedure for declaring a marriage null and void. With the exception of bigamy and not meeting the minimum age requirement for marriage, it is rarely granted. A marriage can be declared null and void if certain legal requirements were not met at the time of the marriage. If these legal requirements were not met then the marriage is considered to have never existed in the eyes of the law. This process is called annulment. It is very different from divorce in that while a divorce dissolves a marriage that has existed, a marriage that is annulled never existed at all. Thus unlike divorce, it is retroactive: an annulled marriage is considered never to have existed.

Section 12 of Hindu marriage Act,1955

Voidable Marriages :-

(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:-

a.that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings; or

b.that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of section 5; or

c.that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner is required under section 5, the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or fraud; or

d.that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

 

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage-

a.on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained if-

(i) the petition is presented more than one year after for force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or

(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered;

b.on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section

(1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied- (i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;

(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and

(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree.

 

 

 

 

 

cruelty ground for Divorce under hindu marriage act.

 

cruelty ground for divorce under hindu marriage act.

 Before the trial Court, on the side of the petitioner/wife, she has examined herself as PW.1 and marked 4 documents as Exs.P1 to P4 and on the side of the respondent/husband, he has examined himself as RW.1 and marked 13 documents as Exs.R1 to R13. The Trial Court, after analysing the entire pleadings and evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the contention of the petitioner/wife that the respondent/husband has caused mental and physical cruelty to the petitioner/wife is proved and therefore the petitioner/wife is entitled for divorce on theground of cruelty. The Trial Court has further held that the petitioner/wife is entitled for permanent alimony of Rs.5 lakhs from the respondent/husband. Aggrieved with the above said order, the respondent/husband has preferred this appeal.
21. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner-wife has submitted that the petitioner has alleged several incidences of cruelty in the petition and the petitioner has deposed to prove the same and since the above said incidences happened between the husband and wife, the petitioner-wife alone is competent to speak about the alleged cruelty and the Trial Court has correctly discussed and held that the petitioner-wife has proved the alleged cruelty and granteddivorce on the ground of cruelty and also the permanent alimony awarded by the Trial Court is just and reasonable and no need to interfere with the above said findings of the Trial Court.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant/respondent has relied on the following decisions:
“1. DR.N.G.DASTANE Vs. MRS. S. DASTANE (AIR 1975 SC 1534)
2. P.ABIRAMI Vs. D.E. TAMILARASAN (2012 (2) CTC 607) and
3. SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH (2007 (3) CTC 464)”
and contended that the burden of proof lies only on the petitioner to establish her case and also contended that mere trivial irritations, quarrels and normal wear and tear of married life, which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mentalcruelty and the petitioner has not pleaded with material particulars like date and month and also not pleaded and proved the specific acts of cruelty and therefore the petitioner-wife is not entitled to the relief of divorce on the ground of cruelty.
“74. …. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mentalcruelty. ….”
In the above said decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
29. In the instant case, the petitioner-wife has filed petition for divorce on the ground ofcruelty and therefore as per the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above decision relied on by the respondent/husband, the petitioner/wife has to prove the alleged incidences of cruelty by adducing reliable evidence.
———————————————————————————————————
IN  THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :      16 .8.2012

CORAM:


THE HONOURABLE  MR.JUSTICE  C.NAGAPPAN
and
THE HONOURABLE  MR.JUSTICE  R.KARUPPIAH


C.M.A No.887 of 2010
and
MP.No.1 of 2010
---

A.Sukumar     .. Appellant/Respondent
 
       Vs.

K.S.Chitra     .. Respondent/Petitioner

 Prayer:  This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred against the fair and decretal order, dated 27.10.2009, passed  in  F.C.O.P.No.918 of 2003 on the file  of  the  Principal  Family Court, Chennai.   

  For Appellant            :   Mr.S.Soundararajan
          for  Mr.K.S.Natarajan
 
  For Respondent         :   Mr.D.J.Venkatesan  
  
          ----

JUDGMENT
R.KARUPPIAH,J.
This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the fair and decretal order, dated 27.10.2009, passed in F.C.O.P.No.918 of 2003 on the file of the Principal Family Court, Chennai. The respondent in the petition is the appellant herein. In this Judgment, for the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the petition.
2. The respondent/petitioner, who is the wife of the appellant, has filed petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and also for permanent alimony of Rs.10 lakhs.
3. Briefly, the case of the petitioner/wife is that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnised on 26.1.1996 according to Hindu rites and customs and out of wedlock, a daughter viz. Varshini, aged 6 years and a son viz. Sanjay, aged 1 = years, were born. The respondent is employed as Reservation Clerk in Southern Railway and the petitioner is employed as Clerk in Indian Bank, Perambur.
4. According to the petitioner, at the time of marriage, the respondent’s father informed that all his sons were settled in life and they were all living in their own house and on believing the abovesaid fact, the petitioner’s parents consented for the marriage, but his elder brother Kirubakaran, who was married and having children, was unemployed and the entire family was depending upon the respondent and the respondent’s father had chosen the petitioner in the interest of her income from employment. Further, the respondent’s father and brother insisted the petitioner and the respondent to vacate the house since they wanted to rent out that portion and to utilise the rental income for the said Kirubakaran’s family.
5. It is further stated in the petition that the respondent raised loan and purchased house at No.49, Janagiram Reddy Colony, Villivakkam and as there was insufficiency of funds to purchase the house, he forced the petitioner to collect money from her parents and he had beaten up the petitioner black and blue everyday for not asking money from her parents. The petitioner has further stated that the respondent went to the extent of dashing the face and head of the petitioner on wall by holding her hair in his hands and unable to bear the torture, the petitioner requested her parents, who had helped her by giving Rs.1 lakh from their pension. It is further stated that the petitioner was not even permitted to see or handle the pass-book or cheque books and her jewelleries in the bank locker maintained by the respondent and thus the petitioner was subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally by the respondent.
6. It is further stated in the petition that after vacating from own house, the respondent’s father constructed shops in the building and arranged for permanent income to the said Kirubakaran and for those construction, the respondent, his father and brother jointly humiliated the petitioner to ask for money from her parents and also encouraged the respondent to beat the petitioner severely and also the respondent’s father and brother threatened the petitioner in indecent manner even in the presence of the respondent.
7. The petitioner has further averred in the petition that the respondent had behaved brutally in the sexual life and he used to wake up the petitioner during mid night and had violent sex with her and when the petitioner refused or expressed her tiredness due to over work, the respondent kicked and assaulted the petitioner and also blackmailed the petitioner to subject herself for violent sexual acts otherwise he will bring call girls to home and he will have sex with them in the presence of the petitioner. It is further stated that the respondent was always suspicious and teased the petitioner and also doubted each and every act of the petitioner and the respondent has refused to purchase the necessary provisions for family and also refused even to give Rs.10 extra as pocket money to the petitioner and on many occasions, inspite of ill-health and tiredness, the petitioner was not able to have a cup of coffee or tea at her working place. The petitioner has further stated that harassment and tortures were increasing day by day and the petitioner was waiting with confidence that the respondent will realise his mistakes and correct himself, but the respondent had taken advantage of the goodness and he started her teasing her through the female child by persuading the child.
8. It is further stated in the petition that on 25.4.2003, the respondent forced the petitioner for sex in the early morning and when the petitioner was not willing, he assaulted her severely and threw her out from the matrimonial home by saying that she was not useful for his sexual life and she has to bring Rs.2 lakhs from her parents, otherwise he will not accept her and therefore the petitioner was living with her parents.
9. The petitioner has further stated that on 27.4.2003, when the petitioner was standing in Villivakkam Railway Station, the respondent shouted at her in most indecent manner by using unparliamentary words and hence the petitioner returned her home and took her brother and escorted her to reach her work place and on the same day, after the petitioner left the house, the respondent’s father and brother entered her parents’ house and abused them in the filthy language and threw their chappals on the petitioner’s parents. While the petitioner’s maternal uncle tried to prevent the situation, he was assaulted by the respondent’s father and brother and hence the petitioner lodged police complaint on 28.5.2003 with W-5 All Women Police Station, Anna Nagar, Chennai which has been proved futile and therefore the petitioner has filed this petition to grant a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent and also to grant permanent alimony of Rs.10 lakhs for children.
10. The respondent-husband has filed detailed counter and denied the averments in the petition and stated that there are no sufficient grounds for the grant of divorce and according to Hindu Law, marriage is a sacrament and the relationship of the husband and wife cannot be severed on such flimsy and frivolous allegations. According to the version of respondent, the marriage was held only after enquiring about status of the respondent by petitioner’s father. Further, respondent’s brother viz. Kirubakaran is a technically qualified person and at the time of marriage, he was working in private concern at Ambattur Industrial Estate and his earning was more than sufficient for entire family expenses and he was never depending upon the income of the respondent and therefore the allegations that Kirubakaran was unemployed and his family was depending upon the respondent are all false. The respondent has also denied the allegation that the petitioner was treated by the respondent’s elder brother Kirubakaran and his father as a money lending machine. According to respondent, his father was a retired Railway employee and he is getting pension and also agricultural income and it is sufficient for his retired life and he is not dependent either on the petitioner or respondent’s income.
11. It is further averred in the counter that at the time of marriage, the petitioner was working at Golden Rock Railway Station, Tiruchirapalli till March, 1998 and the respondent was in Chennai and during the weekends, the respondent used to visit Trichy and similarly the petitioner also used to visit Chennai to spend holidays with the respondent. It is further stated in the counter that the petitioner got transferred in April 1998 and thereafter both the petitioner and the respondent stayed together and led a happy life.
12. The respondent has further stated in the counter that the allegations made in the petition that the petitioner was beaten up by the respondent black and blue every day for not asking money from her parents and he went to the extent of dashing the face and head of the petitioner against the wall are all absolutely false and the respondent never been any rude or atrocious behaviour and in fact the respondent on several occasions has shown his love and affection towards the petitioner in abundance. The respondent has further denied the averment that the petitioner was not even permitted to see or handle the pass book, cheque book and jewellery in the bank locker and the petitioner was never restricted to operate her bank account by the respondent being an Either or Survivor account. It is further stated in the counter that the respondent’s father sold his agricultural land of 3 acres at Magarai village and out of the above said amount and also the loan of Rs. 3 lakhs from Ramakrishnapuram Building Society Limited, Villivakkam, he constructed shops near the existing building and it is false to state that the respondent availed loan for the construction and it is constructed for providing a permanent income to the respondent’s brother Kirubakaran. The respondent has also denied the allegation that the respondent’s father and brother jointly humiliated and harassed the petitioner and insisted her to ask money from her parents and the petitioner never suffered any cruelty through the respondent or by his relatives and also denied the averment that the respondent was always suspicious and teased the petitioner without any limitation. It is further stated in the counter that the respondent had never made any harassment and torture to the petitioner and also denied the allegation that the respondent teased her through female child by pampering the child.
13. The respondent has further stated in the counter that since the petitioner had an aversion in joint family, the respondent availed housing loan of Rs.3 lakhs on 5.8.1998 from his bank, Rs.75,000/- from Ind Bank Housing Limited, received Rs.50,000/- from petitioner’s mother as a hand loan and received Rs.40,000/- from his father and purchased a flat for Rs.4,65,000/- and occupied on 6.9.1998 and the petitioner and the respondent jointly lived for five months from April, 1998 to August, 1998. It is further stated that the respondent had repaid the hand loan obtained from the petitioner’s mother and his father. The respondent has further stated that he availed another housing loan of Rs.1,50,000/- during November, 2001 from his employer for alteration and interior decoration of his flat and repaid the loan amount as Rs.2,200/- pm. The respondent has specifically denied the averment made in the petition that the respondent forced the petitioner to collect money from her parents either for purchase of flat or for repayment of loan and also denied the allegation that petitioner’s parents gave Rs.1,00,000/-.
14. The respondent has further stated in the counter that the alleged incidents happened on 25.4.2003 are false and cooked up for the petition. According to respondent, on 25.4.2003, the respondent planned to go to Thiruttani Temple along with his family and he requested the petitioner to accompany them but the petitioner refused and asked him to take only her children and the respondent requested again and again but the petitioner shouted and quarreled with the respondent. It is further stated that the petitioner has no faith in Hinduism and therefore the respondent had cancelled the programme and went to his office and the petitioner also went to her office without preparing any food and on that day, she went to her parents’ house. The respondent has further stated that he tried to talk with the petitioner over phone but the petitioner refused. It is further stated that besides humiliating the respondent, the petitioner gave strict instruction to her parents not to talk with the respondent and it is clear proof for her bad behaviour with the respondent.
15. It is further stated in the counter that on 27.4.2003, being a holiday, the respondent met the petitioner at Villivakkam Railway Station on her way to office and tried to compromise but she refused to talk with him and returned to her parents’ house. The respondent has further denied the allegation in the petition that the respondent’s father and brother entered the petitioner’s parents’ house and abused them in filthy language and threw chappals on the petitioner’s parents and in fact, the petitioner’s father went to petitioner’s house to persuade the petitioner to live with the respondent and lead a happy married life. The respondent has further stated that the petitioner, on a strong influence of her parents, does not desire to continue the marital tie with ulterior motive.
16. The respondent has also stated in the counter that the petitioner lodged a false police complaint on 28.4.2003 and the police conducted enquiry and tried to compromise them but it failed since the petitioner was adamant. It is further averred in the counter that the female child S.Varshini was staying with the respondent and another male child S.Sanjay was staying with the petitioner and the petitioner never allowed to see the child and it clearly shows the amount of cruelty caused to the respondent by the petitioner. The respondent has further stated in the counter that inspite of various allegations against the respondent, the respondent is for reunion only and the petitioner is not showing any indication to live with the respondent. It is further stated by the respondent that the permanent alimony claimed in the petition is only to harass the respondent and put in mental agony and torture on the petitioner’s hands and at any rate, the claim of permanent alimony is high and not maintainable and therefore prayed for dismissal of the above said petition.
17. Before the trial Court, on the side of the petitioner/wife, she has examined herself as PW.1 and marked 4 documents as Exs.P1 to P4 and on the side of the respondent/husband, he has examined himself as RW.1 and marked 13 documents as Exs.R1 to R13. The Trial Court, after analysing the entire pleadings and evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the contention of the petitioner/wife that the respondent/husband has caused mental and physical cruelty to the petitioner/wife is proved and therefore the petitioner/wife is entitled for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The Trial Court has further held that the petitioner/wife is entitled for permanent alimony of Rs.5 lakhs from the respondent/husband. Aggrieved with the above said order, the respondent/husband has preferred this appeal.
18. The points for determination in this appeal are:
“1. Whether the petitioner-wife is entitled to divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
2. Whether the petitioner-wife is entitled to permanent alimony as claimed by her in the petition?”
19. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the entire materials on record.
20. The learned counsel for the respondent/husband has submitted that the Trial Court came to erroneous conclusion that the respondent/husband continued to demand more money from the petitioner/wife without any oral and documentary evidence and the trial Court without applying its mind and believing the evidence of petitioner-wife, without any proof to the same, has held that the respondent has doubted the act of the petitioner and also the respondent/husband had behaved brutally in sexual life and violent with her. He has further submitted that the Trial Court has failed to consider the evidence of the respondent/husband that the respondent/husband was leading marital life as dutiful husband as well as much abundant of love and affection towards his wife and children beyond doubt, but the Trial Court only based on the police complaint dated 28.4.2003 came to the conclusion that the alleged incidence of cruelty was proved by the petitioner/wife. The learned counsel for the respondent/husband has further contended that the respondent has not caused any mental or physical cruelty to the petitioner as alleged in the petition and the petitioner/wife has failed to prove the alleged incidences of cruelty by any sufficient oral and documentary evidence. He has further submitted that the Trial Court has failed to consider the fact that petitioner/wife was Central Government employee and other material facts and arbitrarily awarded Rs.5 lakhs as permanent alimony and therefore prayed for setting aside the above said order and decree passed by the Trial Court.
21. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner-wife has submitted that the petitioner has alleged several incidences of cruelty in the petition and the petitioner has deposed to prove the same and since the above said incidences happened between the husband and wife, the petitioner-wife alone is competent to speak about the alleged cruelty and the Trial Court has correctly discussed and held that the petitioner-wife has proved the alleged cruelty and granted divorce on the ground of cruelty and also the permanent alimony awarded by the Trial Court is just and reasonable and no need to interfere with the above said findings of the Trial Court.
22. It is not in dispute that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent was solemnised on 26.1.1996 according to Hindu rites and customs and out of wedlock, a daughter viz. Varshini and a son viz. Sanjay were born and it is also not in dispute that both the husband and wife were employees and lived together as husband and wife till 25.4.2003.
23. The incidences of cruelty alleged by the petitioner/wife are as under:
(1) The entire family of the respondent/husband was depending upon the income of the respondent and his elder brother Kirubakaran who was married and having children was unemployed and the respondent’s father had chosen the petitioner in the interest of income from her employment and the petitioner was treated by cruelty.
(2) The respondent-husband forced the petitioner/wife to collect money from her parents when the respondent raised loan and purchased house at No.49, Janagiram Reddy Colony, Villivakkam as there was insufficiency of funds to purchase the house and the respondent/husband beaten the petitioner/wife black and blue everyday for not asking money from her parents and the respondent/husband went to the extent of dashing the face and head of petitioner/wife on wall by holding her hair in his hands and unbearable with the above said tortures, the petitioner-wife requested her parents, who had helped her by giving Rs.1 lakh from their pension.
(3) After vacating the respondent/husband and petitioner/wife from the own house, the respondent’s father constructed shops and at that time, the respondent, his brother and father have jointly humiliated and harassed the petitioner to ask for money from her parents and also encouraged the respondent to beat the petitioner-wife severely so that she will collect money from her parents.
(4) the respondent had behaved brutally in sexual life and he used to wake up the petitioner during the mid-night and had violent sex with her and when the petitioner refused and expressed her tiredness due to over work, the respondent-husband kicked and assaulted his wife and also the respondent blackmailed the petitioner to subject herself for violent sexual life otherwise he will bring call girls home and he will have sex with them in the presence of petitioner-wife.
(5) The respondent was always suspicious and teased the petitioner and the respondent doubted each and every act of the petitioner and also the respondent refused to purchase necessary provisions for the family.
(6) On 25.4.2003, the respondent-husband forced the petitioner-wife for sex in the early morning and when she was not willing, the respondent assaulted her severely and threw her from matrimonial home by saying that she was not useful for his sexual life and also asked to bring Rs.2 lakhs from her parents otherwise he will not accept her.
(7) On 27.4.2003, when the petitioner-wife was standing in Villivakkam Railway Station, the respondent shouted at her in most indecent manner by using unparliamentary words and hence the petitioner-wife returned back home and took her brother to escort her to reach her work place and on the same day, after the petitioner-wife left the house, the respondent’s father and brother entered the petitioner-wife’s parents house and abused them in filthy language and threw chappals on the petitioner-wife’s parents and therefore the petitioner-wife lodged a complaint on 28.4.2003 with W.5 All Women Police Station.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant/respondent has relied on the following decisions:
“1. DR.N.G.DASTANE Vs. MRS. S. DASTANE (AIR 1975 SC 1534)
2. P.ABIRAMI Vs. D.E. TAMILARASAN (2012 (2) CTC 607) and
3. SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH (2007 (3) CTC 464)”
and contended that the burden of proof lies only on the petitioner to establish her case and also contended that mere trivial irritations, quarrels and normal wear and tear of married life, which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty and the petitioner has not pleaded with material particulars like date and month and also not pleaded and proved the specific acts of cruelty and therefore the petitioner-wife is not entitled to the relief of divorce on the ground of cruelty.
25. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner-wife relied on the following decisions:
“1. SATISH SITOLE Vs. SMT. GANGA (AIR 2008 SC 3093)
2. SAPNA Vs. B. PRADEEP KUMAR (MANU/TN/0823/ 2012 = II (2012 DMC 35)
3. VISHWANATH S/O SITARAM AGRAWAL Vs. SAU. SARLA VISHWANATH AGRAWAL (MANU/SC/0513/2012) and
4. SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH (2007 (3) CTC 464)”
and would submit that the petitioner-wife has clearly stated the incidences of mental and physical cruelty in the petition and also the petitioner has testified the above said facts at the time of evidence and further submitted that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnised on 26.1.1996 and on 25.4.2003 onwards the petitioner and respondent were not living together and the petition was filed on 14.5.2003 and it would not be possible for them hereafter to live as husband and wife unitedly and the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent had completely broken down beyond repair and therefore it is a clear case of irretrievable break down of marriage between the parties and therefore the petitioner-wife is entitled to obtain a decree of divorce and the trial Court has correctly dissolved the marriage by granting divorce on the ground of cruelty.
26. In the decision relied on by the respondent-husband in DR.N.G.DASTANE Vs. MRS. S. DASTANE (AIR 1975 SC 1534), it is observed in para No.23 as under:
“23. …. First, as to the nature of burden of proof which rests on a petitioner in a matrimonial petition under the Act. Doubtless, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party which denies it. This principle accords with commonsense as it is so much easier to prove a positive than a negative. The petitioner must therefore prove that the respondent has treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 10(1)(b) of the Act. “
In the above said decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has clearly laid down the principle that the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to establish his or her case and therefore the petitioner must prove that the respondent has treated her with cruelty.
27. The learned counsel for the respondent-husband has relied on another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in P.ABIRAMI Vs. D.E. TAMILARASAN (2012 (2) CTC 607), in which, para 16 reads as under:
“16. As far as the allegation of mental cruelty is concerned, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the acts alleged against the Appellant, which according to the Respondent, amounts to causing mental cruelty, have not been pleaded with material particulars like the date and month. No specific acts which amounted to causing mental cruelty have been pleaded with material particulars. Only general allegations have been made against the Appellant by the Respondent in the Petition. In the Petition before the Court below, it has not been stated that due to the Appellant’s higher education and wealth and due to superiority complex what was the nature of the behaviour and what was the activity of the Appellant, which caused mental cruelty to the Respondent. Though it has been alleged in the Petition that the Appellant failed to act as a dutiful wife from the date of marriage till the date she left the matrimonial home, the Petition is silent as to what was the duty that was not performed by her.”
In the above decision, this Court has clearly held that as far as the allegation of mental cruelty, the alleged acts have not been pleaded with material particulars like date and month and no specific acts which amounted causing mental cruelty have been pleaded with material particulars and only general allegations have been made and therefore this Court has set aside the decree of divorce granted on the ground of mental cruelty.
28. Further, in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH (2007 (3) CTC 464), relied on by both the learned counsel for the petitioner/wife and the respondent/husband, it is held in para 74 as under:
“74. …. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. ….”
In the above said decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
29. In the instant case, the petitioner-wife has filed petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty and therefore as per the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above decision relied on by the respondent/husband, the petitioner/wife has to prove the alleged incidences of cruelty by adducing reliable evidence.
30. Admittedly, to prove the above said incidences of cruelty, on the side of the petitioner/wife, she has not examined any other witness except the interested testimony of the petitioner. Further, on the side of the petitioner, she has marked the marriage invitation as Ex.P1, marriage photo as Ex.P2 and the copy of alleged police complaint dated 28.4.2003 as Ex.P3, given by the petitioner 16 days prior to filing of the petition for divorce and copy of receipt dated 29.4.2003 as Ex.P4 and therefore the oral testimony of the petitioner alone is available to prove the alleged incidences of cruelty. On the side of the respondent/husband, to falsify the contention of the petitioner, the respondent has deposed as RW.1 and also marked Exs.R1 to R13. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnised after six months of betrothal and both the petitioner and respondent’s parents’ houses are situated nearby. Further, the petitioner herself has admitted in her evidence that the petitioner and respondent were not living along with other family members and immediately after marriage, a separate portion was allotted for them and the parents of the respondent and one brother of the respondent viz. Ravikumar were living in another portion and another elder brother of the respondent viz. Kirubakaran was living in upstair portion separately and both the petitioner and the respondent were living only for six months in the above said house and then constructed a new house and lived separately.
31. Further, it is an admitted fact that the respondent’s father viz. Appadurai is a retired Railway employee and getting his pension and also having agricultural lands. It is also revealed that the elder brother of the respondent viz. Kirubakaran is a technically qualified person and he was working in private concern at Ambattur Industrial Estate. Further the petitioner has admitted in her evidence that there is no quarrel between her and the parents of the respondent while living separately in respondent’s parents’ house and after shifting to new house also, the parents of the respondent came there and the petitioner and respondent also used to visit the respondent’s parents’ house and also admitted that even after vacating the house, only the brother of the respondent viz. Kirubakaran was living in the portion and not rented out to anybody.
32. In the above circumstances, on the side of the petitioner, she has not stated any specific incident of demanding money from the petitioner by the family members of the respondent, particularly, by the respondent’s elder brother Kirubakaran. Therefore the allegations of the petitioner that the respondent’s father has chosen the petitioner only in the interest of her income from employment and the entire family of the respondent was depending upon the income of the respondent are not proved by reliable documentary evidence except the interested testimony of the petitioner and as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the particulars of demand of money from the petitioner like date, month etc. are not stated in the petition and also not deposed at the time of evidence by the petitioner and therefore the above said incidences of cruelty alleged by the petitioner are not proved.
33. The second and third incidences of cruelty alleged by the petitioner are that the respondent had beaten the petitioner black and blue everyday for not asking money from her parents at the time of purchasing the house at No.49, Janagiram Reddy Colony, Villivakkam and also the respondent went to the extent of dashing the head of the petitioner on the wall by holding her hair in his hands and tortured the petitioner and hence the petitioner requested her parents, who helped by giving Rs.1 lakh from the pension and the respondent and his parents humiliated the petitioner and beaten severely. To prove the above said allegations, except the oral testimony of the petitioner, there is no other oral and documentary evidence. The petitioner has not stated any reason for non-examining the parents of the petitioner to prove the above said demand of money and payment of Rs.1 lakh amount as demanded by the respondent. Further, a perusal of oral evidence of the petitioner reveals that she has deposed completely contradictory with the averments in the petition. In one place, she has stated that before registering document, as demanded by respondent, Rs.25,000/- and after that another Rs.25,000/- was given by her mother and Rs.50,000/- was given by her father and totally Rs.1 lakh was given and after retirement, her father had given Rs.50,000/- i.e., after 2002. The above said fact is not stated in the petition. The same petitioner had again deposed contrary to the above said fact that at the time of purchase of the above said house, the father of the petitioner has not given any amount and only after retirement, he has given amount to the respondent. Admittedly, the above said flat purchased in the year 1998 and the father of the petitioner was retired only in the year 2002 and hence out of retirement benefits, Rs.1 lakh was given to purchase flat is proved as false. The parents of the petitioner alone are competent persons to speak about the facts but they were not examined by the petitioner. Therefore a perusal of oral testimony of the petitioner reveals that the petitioner has falsely deposed about the demand of money as alleged in the petition. The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that in the year 1998, the flat was purchased for Rs.4,65,000/- by availing housing loan for Rs.3 lakhs on 5.8.1998 from respondent’s bank under the capacity of an employee and to prove the same, Ex.R2 loan sanction letter has been marked and the respondent has availed Rs.75,000/- from Ind Bank Housing Limited on 17.8.1998 and to prove the same, Ex.R3 was marked and the petitioner’s mother gave hand loan of Rs.50,000/- and the respondent’s father gave hand loan of Rs.40,000/- and the respondent has repaid the hand loan of the petitioner’s mother and also the respondent’s father on instalment basis. The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondent reveal that the allegation of the petitioner that Rs.1 lakh was paid for purchase of the above said flat is false and therefore the alleged second and third cruelties are not proved.
34. With regard to fourth and fifth incidences of cruelty are concerned, except the oral testimony of the petitioner, no other evidence was adduced to prove the above said allegations. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the above said incidences happened between the husband and wife and therefore the petitioner alone is competent to speak about the said fact. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that if really the above said incidences happened, certainly the petitioner would have informed her parents or relatives or co-workers, but in this case, except the petitioner nobody was examined to prove the above said allegations.
35. Further, the petitioner has stated in her evidence that the respondent assaulted the petitioner and caused injuries and taken treatment in the hospital but she has not produced any document and not examined the doctor or parents of the petitioner or neighbour to prove the above said incident. It is further contended that the petitioner was forced to collect money from her parents and the respondent has beaten black and blue everyday for not asking money from her parents and also alleged that the respondent, his brother and father have jointly humiliated and harassed the petitioner to ask for money from her parents and also encouraged the respondent to beat the petitioner to collect money from her parents. The above allegations are all not proved by adducing reliable evidence. Therefore the fourth and fifth incidences of cruelty are not proved by the petitioner as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent.
36. With regard to sixth and seventh incidences of cruelties are concerned, except the oral testimony of the petitioner, no other evidence like parents, brother, neighbour, co-worker who are competent witnesses was adduced to prove the above said allegations. As already discussed, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was held on 26.1.1996 and they were living as husband and wife till 25.4.2003. During the above said period, no complaint of any harassment or any complaint to the police was filed and therefore as contended by learned counsel for appellant/respondent the above said allegations have been made in the petition only for filing the petition for divorce and therefore the above said sixth and seventh cruelties are also not proved.
37. The Trial Court, only relying on the oral testimony of the petitioner, who is interested witness, granted divorce as if the alleged incidences were proved. The Trial Court has not considered the contentions of the respondent and the oral and documentary evidence adduced on the side of the respondent to disprove the contentions of the petitioner. Therefore, a careful reading of oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides reveal that the petitioner has not proved the alleged incidences of cruelty by reliable oral and documentary evidence, but the Trial Court has wrongly held that as if the petitioner has proved the alleged incidences of cruelty.
38. At the time of argument before this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the marriage was held on 26.1.1996 and from 25.4.2003 onwards both husband and wife were not living together and therefore the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has completely broken down beyond repair and it is a clear case of irretrievable break down of marriage between the parties and on that ground, he prayed for divorce. To substantiate the above said contention, he relied on two decisions as already stated. In the decision reported in SATISH SITOLE Vs. SMT. GANGA (AIR 2008 SC 3093), the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in para 12 as under:
“12. In the said circumstances, following the decision of this Court in Romesh Chander’s case (supra) we also are of the view that since the marriage between the parties is dead for all practical purposes and there is no chance of it being retrieved, the continuance of such marriage would itself amount to cruelty, and, accordingly, in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution we direct that the marriage of the appellant and the respondent shall stand dissolved, subject to the appellant paying to the respondent a sum of Rupees Two lakhs by way of permanent alimony. In addition, the appellant shall also pay the costs of this appeal to the respondent assessed at Rs.25,000/-. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”
39. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Honourable Supreme Court has exercised the power under Article 142 of the Constitution and held that since for 14 years the appellant and respondent lived separately and all attempts for re-union failed, the marriage has been broken down irretrievably and dissolved the marriage in the above decision.
40. In another decision in SAPNA Vs. B. PRADEEP KUMAR (MANU/TN/0823/ 2012 = II (2012 DMC 35), relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court also held that the marriage between the wife and husband has completely broken down beyond repair and it is clear case of irretrievable break down of marriage between the parties and therefore granted divorce.
41. In the instant case, the marriage was held on 26.1.1996 and both the respondent and petitioner were living together till 25.4.2003 as husband and wife and out of the said wedlock, they have two children. On the side of the petitioner, she has not proved the fact that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and on that ground alone the petitioner is not entitled to divorce.
42. From the above discussion, we are of the view that the petitioner/wife has not proved the alleged incidences of cruelty by her husband by adducing reliable evidence and the Trial Court has erroneously held that the alleged incidences of cruelty were proved and granted divorce and therefore the above said order of the Trial Court on the ground of cruelty is liable to be set aside.
43. We are also of the considered view that the petitioner wife is not entitled to any amount as permanent alimony since the petition filed by the petitioner/wife for divorce is not maintainable as already discussed in earlier paragraphs. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled for permanent alimony as prayed for in the petition and we answer the points accordingly.
 44.  In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and the order and decretal order dated 27.10.2009 passed by the          Trial Court in F.C.O.P.No.918  of 2003  are set aside and the petition in  F.C.O.P.No.918  of 2003  is dismissed.   Considering the relationship of the parties, there shall be no order as to costs.  Connected  MP.No.1 of 2010 is  closed.

           (C.N.J.)          (R.K.J.)
         16.8.2012
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Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Divorce on Cruelty Grounds in India

Grounds For Divorce in India.

In so many Judgments the Hon”ble Supreme Court and Hon”ble High Court has dissolved the marriage on the grounds of cruelty.

for example if the girl has filed a false complaint against the whole family members of the husbands and if the concerned magistrate has discharged the family members in the case of 498a IPC then its a cruelty upon the husband and good grounds for dissolved the marriage.

please see the recent judgment passed by the Hon”ble Delhi High Court in the matter of

See the whole Judgment:

MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 1 of 11
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
MAT APP No. 98/2010
Judgment delivered on: 19.11.2010
Smt. Nitu Aggarwal ….. Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajiv Shukla, Adv.
Versus
Sh.Gireesh Gupta ….. Respondent
Through: Mr.Gyan Prakash, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR,
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. Oral:
*
1. By this appeal filed under Section 28 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the appellant seeks to challenge
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 2 of 11
the judgment and decree dated 27.4.2010, passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, whereby a decree
of judicial separation was passed.
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for deciding the
present appeal are that the parties got married on 5.11.03
at Noida according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and a
female child was born out of wedlock on 14.9.04. The
matrimonial relations between the parties were stained
right from the very beginning of their married life and
distressed by the behaviour of the appellant, the respondent
filed a petition under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 for a decree of judicial separation on the ground of
cruelty which vide judgment dated 27.4.10 was granted.
Feeling aggrieved with the same, the appellant has filed the
present appeal.
3. Mr. Rajiv Shukla, counsel for the appellant
submits that the learned trial court has wrongly assumed
that the appellant had consumed some poisonous substance
with a view to commit suicide. The contention of the
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 3 of 11
counsel for the appellant is that the respondent used to
compel and force the appellant to consume certain
medicines under the pretext that the same were good for
her health and for the child in the womb. Counsel further
submits that the respondent also failed to prove on record
that an attempt of suicide by the appellant was made with
a view to coerce the respondent to accede to any of her
demands and in the absence of any such assertion on the
part of the respondent, no logic or rationale behind the
alleged attempt of suicide by the appellant could be
established by the respondent. Explaining the contradiction
on the part of the appellant in the FIR lodged by her under
Section 498A/406/34 IPC, counsel submits that even if the
appellant in the said FIR took a stand that the respondent
had given her something to drink, the same will not make
any difference vis-à-vis her stand in the matrimonial
proceedings where she had stated that the respondent used
to administer some medicines. Counsel thus submits that
there was a minor variation in the stand of the appellant
which would not amount to any kind of self contradiction on
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 4 of 11
her part. Counsel thus states that there is clear infirmity and
perversity in the findings of the learned trial court on this
aspect and the same should be set aside.
4. Assailing the impugned judgment on another
ground, counsel submits that the learned trial court has
wrongly observed that the implication of the relatives of the
respondent is in itself an act of cruelty against the
respondent. The contention of the counsel for the appellant
is that the mere fact that the said relatives were not charge
sheeted by the police would not show that the allegations
leveled by the appellant against the relatives of the
respondent were false. The contention of the counsel is
that at the stage of framing of charges, it would be for the
concerned Criminal Court to see whether based on the
allegations leveled by the appellant in her criminal
complaint such relatives are required to be proceeded
against or not.
5. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand
refutes the submissions made by the counsel for the
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 5 of 11
appellant and submits that the present appeal deserves to
be dismissed at the admission stage itself as the appellant
has failed to point out any material illegality or perversity in
the order passed by the learned trial court.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The petition under Section 10 of the Hindu
Marriage Act was preferred by the respondent husband so
as to seek a decree of judicial separation from the appellant
on the ground of cruelty. The marriage between the parties
was solemnized according to Hindu rites and ceremonies on
5.11.2003 and both the parties are well educated
academically. One of the allegations leveled by the
respondent against the appellant is that the appellant had
consumed some poisonous drink on 18.8.2004 and her
condition became very critical in the morning of 18.8.2004
and she was immediately taken to Kailash Hospital, Noida
and it is only on account of the timely action taken by the
respondent and his parents that life of the appellant and
the unborn child could be saved. It is an admitted case of
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 6 of 11
the parties that subsequent to the filing of the said petition
by the respondent husband the appellant wife got
registered one criminal complaint under Section
498A/406/34 IPC vide FIR No. 498/2005 not only against
the respondent but his parents and some other relatives as

well. Some of the relatives implicated by the appellant in the
said complaint case were the residents of far off places like
Saharanpur and Baroda. It is also an admitted case of the
parties that the relatives of the respondent were not chargesheeted
by the police as no incriminating material was
found against them during the course of investigation. The
respondent has taken this false implication of his relatives
on the part of the appellant as a ground of cruelty. Learned
trial court has also granted decree of judicial separation in
favour of the respondent and against the appellant taking
the said two grounds clearly establishing the cruel conduct
of the appellant towards the respondent. Before the learned
trial court as well as before this court the appellant has
failed to disclose as to what kind of medicines were being
administered by the respondent to her during the stage of
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 7 of 11
pregnancy on the pretext of the same being good for her
health and that of the unborn child. It is incomprehensible
to accept the argument that the appellant who is a well
qualified lady having a degree of Chartered Accountancy
and Company Secretary would take the medicines without
even knowing what kind of medicines she was taking. The
appellant has also clearly taken a contradictory stand in
her criminal complaint, wherein she stated that she was
given something to drink by the respondent and his parents
on the pretext that it is good for her pregnancy. The
appellant has also not denied the fact that she was admitted
to Kailash Hospital in the morning of 18.8.2004 where she
was treated after having consumed some poisonous
substance. It is also not in dispute that the appellant did not
lodge any police complaint against the respondent or his
parents complaining about administration of some
poisonous medicines by her husband or his parents. The
learned trial court has duly taken into consideration all
these circumstances into account and thus has arrived at a
finding that such an attempt by the appellant to commit
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 8 of 11
suicide is an act of cruelty on her part upon her husband.
8. The concept of cruelty is of wide amplitude and has not
been defined in the act. The Apex Court through various
judicial pronouncements has explained the concept and
scope of cruelty. It would be useful here to refer to the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A. Jayachandra
vs. Aneel Kaur AIR 2005 SC 534 where it was held as
under:
“12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be
“grave and weighty” so as to come to the conclusion that the
petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the
other spouse. It must be something more serious than “ordinary
wear and tear of married life”. The conduct, taking into
consideration the circumstances and background has to be
examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct
complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law.
Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background
of several factors such as social status of parties, their education,
physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is
difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive
description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty.
It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court
that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to
such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it
would be impossible for them to live together without mental
agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to
secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to
constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting
immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute
cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental
cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy
and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental
peace of the other party.
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 9 of 11
13. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground
of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are
those of human beings and the psychological changes in a
spouse’s conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of
the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such
conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the
conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of
severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen
whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would
tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant
should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life.
Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the
other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may
also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of
unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be
words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.”
Cruelty therefore is to be garnered taking the cumulative
effect of all the factors into play. The parties are well
educated and such an attempt to end her life by the
appellant would certainly cause mental agony to the
respondent. It would aggravate the case when the appellant
tried to commit suicide in the state of pregnancy. A highly
educated lady claiming that she was administered poisonous
substance which she was unaware of does not help her case.
No doubt in the petition the respondent did not give any
specific reason or cause behind such suicidal attempt but
it goes without saying that such an act even in the absence
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 10 of 11
of any reason certainly would constitute an act of cruelty on
the respondent husband.
9. Even on the second argument of the counsel for
the appellant, this court does not find any merit in it. The
complaint under Section 498A/406/34 IPC was lodged by the
appellant during the pendency of the said petition filed by
the respondent for judicial separation. In her complaint the
appellant roped in various relatives of the respondent which
include his uncle and aunt residing at Saharanpur and
brother and sister in law residing at Baroda. The learned
trial court is right in taking a view that false implication of
relatives who were residing at far off places from the
matrimonial home of the appellant and against whom there
are no specific allegations of cruelty in itself is an act of
cruelty by the appellant towards her husband. However, as
these relatives were not charge-sheeted by the police the
same would clearly show that the police did not find any
incriminating material against these relatives during the
investigation and this by itself is sufficient enough to show
MAT APP No. 98/2010 Page 11 of 11
that the appellant had roped in and implicated all these
relatives with vengeance to cause unnecessary harassment
to them and such act certainly would cause cruelty to the
husband with whom they are related. Implicating the
relatives with a motive to harass the relatives, residing in
different parts of the country, is nothing but a ruthless act of
harassment. Therefore, the respondent husband has
successfully proved cruelty on the part of the appellant on
both the counts.
10. In the light of the above, this court does not find
any infirmity or illegality in the findings arrived at by the
learned trial court. There is no merit in the present appeal
and the same is hereby dismissed at the stage of admission
itself.
November 19, 2010 KAILASH GAMBHIR, J